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Introduction
In June of 1990, Robert A. Viktora,' a minor, burned a crudely
assembled cross on the front yard of an African-American family's
home in St. Paul, Minnesota.2 The prosecutor charged Viktora under
Saint Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, 3 which provides:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but not limited
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.4
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Viktora's First Amendment
challenge and upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance.5 Viktora
petitioned the United States Supreme Court, which granted certio-
rari.6 The question presented to the Court in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul[7 was whether the ordinance was overbroad in restricting activity
protected by the First Amendment, and thus unconstitutional, or
whether the ordinance was properly limited to acts that fall outside of
First Amendment protection.8 The majority held that the ordinance,
as construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, prohibited only "fight-
ing words" and thus was not unconstitutional for overbreadth
reasons.
9
The majority, however, went on to consider whether the ordi-
nance placed an unjustified, content-based restriction on expression
that does not normally merit First Amendment protection. The Court
concluded that it did,10 extending the strict scrutiny standard usually
1. David Schimmel, Are "Hate Speech" Codes Unconstitutional? An Analysis of
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 76 W. EDuc. L. REP. 653, 654 (1992).
2. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992).
3. Id.
4. ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE § 292.02 (1990).
5. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541; In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510-11 (Minn.
1991).
6. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
7. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
8. See Brief for Petitioner at 2, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 90-
7675) (questions presented); Brief for Respondent at 2, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992) (No. 90-7675) (questions presented).
9. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
10. Id. at 2547-50.
R.A.V. v. CITY OF ST. PAUL
reserved for content-based restrictions on fully protected speech to
fighting words. With this holding, the Court created an underinclu-
siveness test for restrictions on a class of speech, fighting words, it had
once considered unprotected." After R.A.V., any regulation of fight-
ing words that only covers a limited, underinclusive, class of fighting
words is subject to strict scrutiny, whereas regulations covering all
fighting words are not. In enunciating this new doctrine for restric-
tions of fighting words, the Court ventured into uncharted First
Amendment territory with little precedential support and without the
aid of briefing by the parties or by most of the Amici Curiae.'2 Conse-
quently, this significant departure from traditional First Amendment
theory is based on flawed reasoning and hollow rhetoric, which could
have potentially far-reaching effects on other areas of free speech
doctrine.
•The first part of this Comment critically examines the decision in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul3 by assessing both the validity of the major-
ity's new underinclusiveness test for restrictions on fighting words,
and the test's potential impact on First Amendment jurisprudence.
Part II of this Comment examines the case precedent relied on by the
majority and demonstrates how the majority misapplied that prece-
dent in reaching its decision. Part III challenges the analysis the ma-
jority used to support its conclusions. Part IV questions the
exceptions the majority carved out of its new doctrine and highlights
their weaknesses. Part V assesses the potential impact R.A.V. could
have on other areas with First Amendment implications, such as com-
mercial speech and workplace harassment.
I. The R.A. V. Opinions
Although the Justices unanimously found the St. Paul ordinance
unconstitutional, they differed sharply over the rationale for that hold-
ing. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, wrote the opinion of the Court. Jus-
tices White, Stevens, and Blackmun wrote separate concurring opin-
ions with Justice O'Connor joining Justice White.
A. The Majority Opinion
At the outset, the majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held
that the Court was bound by the Minnesota Supreme Court's con-
11. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
12. See infra note 8.
13. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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struction of the St. Paul ordinance limiting its reach to fighting
words.14 Thus, it found that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally
overbroad.15 Justice Scalia next pointed out that, although the First
Amendment generally prevents the government from banning speech
or expression based on its content, some classes of speech, such as
obscenity, defamation, or fighting words, are of "such slight social
value" that the state's interest in order and morality justifies limiting
them. 6 Justice Scalia departed from the literal language of earlier
cases on proscribable speech,' 7 however, and argued that, although
such areas of speech may be limited, they are not entirely unprotected
under the First Amendment. 8 Thus, the majority concluded, while
the government may limit a class of proscribable speech as a whole, it
may not proscribe a subset of that class based on the content of that
subset.' 9
The majority opinion went on to identify three exceptions to the
newly articulated rule. First, Justice Scalia wrote that the government
could validly limit a subclass of speech when the "basis for the content
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of
speech at issue is proscribable."20 Because the government can re-
strict obscenity as a class, it can also restrict the subset of only the
most prurient obscenity, because it is the prurience of obscenity that
makes obscenity proscribable.
In the second exception, the Court held that content-based re-
strictions on expression are valid if that expression is associated with
detrimental "secondary effects."'" "Secondary effects" are harms that
are found alongside, or arise indirectly from, certain classes of other-
14. Id. at 2542. See also In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510-11 (Minn.
1991).
15. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
16. Id. at 2542-43.
17. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984) (noting
that the protection of the First Amendment does not extend to the proscribable classes of
speech); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 475, 483 (1957) (stating that these categories of
expression are "not within the area of constitutionally protected speech").
18. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543.
19. Id at 2543-45.
20. Id. at 2545.
21. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2469-71 (1991) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (finding a law requiring nude dancers to wear G-strings constitutional because
the state's interest in reducing the secondary effects of such dancing, and the means used
by the state, satisfied the O'Brien test); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52-
56 (1986) (upholding as constitutional a zoning regulation requiring that adult theaters be
located a specified distance from a dwelling, church, park, or school because of the harmful
secondary effects associated with such theaters).
R.A.V. v. CITY OF ST. PAUL
wise protected speech. One example is increased prostitution around
adult movie theaters.2' Such effects may justify incidental restrictions
on the class of speech with which they are associated. 3 According to
Justice Scalia, "Where the government does not target conduct on the
basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation
merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.) 24
This exception merely extended the "secondary effects" doctrine into
the area of proscribable speech.
Finally, the Court alluded to a third "catch-all" exception. Justice
Scalia wrote that a wholly arbitrary restriction on a subclass of pros-
cribable speech may be valid so long as the restriction was not aimed
at suppressing ideas or content?25 Thus, under the Court's newly ar-
ticulated doctrine, the government could permissibly prohibit, for ex-
ample, obscene movies that feature blue-eyed actresses. 26
Applying its new construction of the fighting words doctrine to
the St. Paul ordinance, the majority found the ordinance invalid. Ac-
cording to the majority, the ordinance placed an impermissible con-
tent-based restriction on a subclass of fighting words because it
restricted only racial, religious, or gender-based fighting words.27 The
Court held that the ordinance did not fall within any of its three ex-
ceptions.2 The Court concluded that because St. Paul could have ac-
complished its objective with a general ordinance aimed at all fighting
words instead of one limited to "the favored topics," the ordinance
was unconstitutional.29
B. The Concurring Opinions
Justices White, Stevens, and Blackmun authored separate concur-
ring opinions that uniformly condemned the majority approach to
both the R.A.V. ordinance and the fighting words doctrine.30
22. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); see also Barnes, 111 S.
Ct. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring).
23. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
24. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546-47.
25. Id. at 2547.
26. Id.
27. Id. Justice Scalia further noted that the ordinance went beyond simple content-
based discrimination to viewpoint-based discrimination, which he suggested is an even
more unfair limitation on the use of fighting words. Id at 2547-48.
28. Id. at 2548-49.
29. Id. at 2550.
30. Id. at 2550,2560-61. Justices O'Connor and Blackmun joined Justice White's opin-
ion in full, and Justice Stevens joined much of its condemnation of the majority approach.
Id. at 2550. Justices White and Blackmun also joined the portion of Justice Stevens' opin-
ion rejecting the majority's newly articulated doctrine. Id. at 2561.
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Although all agreed that the St. Paul ordinance was unconstitutional,
they did not find it fatally underinclusive. Instead, they agreed that it
was unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalized expressive
conduct beyond mere fighting words and included protected expres-
sion that happened to cause hurt feelings or resentment.3 1 In so find-
ing, the concurring Justices agreed that the Minnesota Supreme
Court's construction of the ordinance limiting it to fighting words was
still too generalized to restrict its impact purely to proscribable
speech.
32
The concurring Justices also unanimously repudiated the majority
approach. They denounced the majority's creation of an underinclu-
siveness doctrine for unprotected speech33 as disregarding longstand-
ing precedent and defying logic, 34  and they rejected it as
unworkable.3 5
H. First Amendment Precedent and the Majority's New
Doctrine
The majority cited numerous First Amendment cases in its exami-
nation of the statute at issue in R.A.V. Although it purported to rely
upon established precedent, the majority did not properly apply it in
creating its new doctrine. In addition, the majority did not examine
all of the relevant cases.
A. The Majority's Misapplication of Key First Amendment Cases
Justice Scalia began the analysis in R.A.V. by noting that the
"First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing
speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the
31. Id. at 2560.
32. Id. at 2558. Although Justices White and Stevens both found the ordinance over-
broad, they disagreed on the proper approach to evaluating restrictions on speech. Justice
White employed the traditional approach of separating classes of speech into distinct cate-
gories of protected and unprotected speech. Id. at 2559. Justice Stevens, on the other
hand, rejected a categorical approach, id. at 2566, in favor of a multi-faceted balancing test
involving several factors, such as the nature and context of the expression and of the con-
tested restrictions. Id. at 2567-69. See generally Schimmel, supra note 1.
33. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2553.
34. Id. at 2552-58 ("This reasoning [from earlier cases] is in direct conflict with the
majority's analysis in the present case . ").
35. Id. at 2558. Justice Blackmun, in his brief concurrence, suggested that the majority
was influenced by its desire to affect the debate surrounding "politically correct speech"
and cultural diversity instead of remaining true to the Court's mission of focussing on the
issues presented in the context of the applicable law. Id. at 2560-61.
ideas expressed."36  Justice Scalia also acknowledged that the
Supreme Court has, over the past 200 years,
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few lim-
ited areas, which are "of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." We
have recognized that "the freedom of speech" referred to by the
First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these
traditional limitations.37
Justice Scalia noted that the Court has "sometimes said that these cat-
egories of expression are 'not within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech' . . . .. ,3 He backpedaled, however, on the issue of
whether only First Amendment protection is afforded to these pros-
cribable classes of speech. Justice Scalia asserted that prior cases
"surely do not establish the proposition that the First Amendment im-
poses no obstacle whatsoever to regulation of particular instances of
such proscribable expression, so that the government 'may regulate
[them] freely.' 39 The majority; however, did not provide any cases
that directly supported this assertion. In fact, most of the cases it cited
actually reached the opposite conclusion.
Like the Minnesota Supreme Court, the majority relied on
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire4" in finding that the St. Paul ordinance
was not overbroad.41 The Court in Chaplinsky held that:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These in-
clude the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utter-
ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be de-
36. Id. at 2542 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-11 (1940); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)).
37. Id. at 2542-43 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
38. Id. (citations omitted).
39. Id. (alteration in original).
40. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Walter Chaplinsky was arrested for saying to the city mar-
shall, "You are a God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist and the whole govern-
ment of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists." Id. at 569 (quotations omitted). He
was convicted under a New Hampshire law barring the use of offensive, derisive or annoy-
ing words directed at others in a public place. Id.
41. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542; In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn.
1991).
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rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.42
In various cases, the Court has reaffirmed that there is no First
Amendment protection for these areas of speech. Discussing fighting
words in Cantwell v. Connecticut,43 the Court held that "[riesort to
epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication
of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its
punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that in-
strument."'  Contrary to the majority's assertion in R.A.V. that the
prior cases did not hold low speech4 5 completely unprotected by the
First Amendment,46 most cases held just that.47
The majority in R.A.V. relied on New York v. Ferber48 to define
the limitations on proscribing low speech. The R.A.V. majority
pointed to a single sentence in Ferber as support for its contention that
low speech is protected from certain proscriptions under the First
Amendment.4 9 The Ferber Court, upholding a statutory ban on child
pornography, stated, "there [is no] question here of censoring a partic-
ular literary theme" or portrayal of sexual activity.5" The R.A.V. ma-
jority took this to mean that any censoring of a particular theme or
subclass of speech regardless of its status as high or low speech would
violate the Constitution.5' It failed to acknowledge, however, that the
statute in Ferber was aimed at expression that encompassed more than
just obscenity and included expression that has traditionally been pro-
42. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
43. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
44. Id. at 309-10.
45. "Low Speech" is another term for proscribable speech such as obscenity or fight-
ing words.
46. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543 (1992).
47. See, e.g., Sable Communications v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) ("We have
repeatedly held that the protection of the First Amendment does not extend to obscene
speech."); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984) ("[Tjhere are
categories of communication and certain special utterances to which the majestic protec-
tion of the First Amendment does not extend .... Libelous speech has been held to
constitute one such category."); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (noting
that obscene material is not entitled to First Amendment protection); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957) (reaffirming prior holdings that certain areas of speech
are not protected under the First Amendment).
48. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
49. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543.
50. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749-50, 763.
51. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543.
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tected as high speech. 2 The Ferber statute was thus subject to tradi-
tional content-based-restriction analysis.
Furthermore, the Ferber Court explicitly stated that categories of
speech not falling within the sphere of the First Amendment are not
entitled to any protection. The Court noted that "[ilt is the content of
[an] utterance that determines whether it is a protected epithet or an
unprotected fighting comment,"53 and that "[t]here are ... limits on
the category of child pornography which, like obscenity, is unprotected
by the First Amendment."'54
Ferber also rejected the notion that restrictions on unprotected
(or lesser protected) categories of expression can be unconstitution-
ally underinclusive. The Ferber Court explicitly stated, "Today, we
hold that child pornography as defined in [the New York statute] is
unprotected speech subject to content-based regulation. Hence, it can-
not be underinclusive or unconstitutional for a State to do precisely
[what New York has done]."' '55
Thus, the Court in Ferber established a distinction between protected
speech and "unprotected" speech, with only restrictions on the former
giving rise to an inquiry of underinclusiveness.
Justice Scalia also cited Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Ferber,
as support for his holding in R.A.V. He referred to her statement that
"New York's statute does not attempt to suppress the communication
of particular ideas."56 Justice Scalia suggested that this statement re-
flected his doctrine of striking down a content-based restriction on
unprotected speech where it serves to suppress particular ideas. Jus-
tice O'Connor, however, emphasized in her concurrence that New
52. The Ferber Court noted that the statute was directed at materials relating to the
theme of underage sexual activity, and not specifically aimed at materials involving under-
age participants and it therefore impinged on protected speech. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749-50.
53. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted) (alteration in
original).
54. Id. at 764 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 765 n.18 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Ferber Court contrasted
the ordinance at issue with one that implicated protected speech and therefore gave rise to
an underinclusiveness claim. The Ferber Court also noted that the statute banning child
pornography:
sufficiently describes a category of material the production and distribution of
which is not entitled to First Amendment protection. It is therefore clear that
there is nothing unconstitutionally "underinclusive" about a statute that singles
out this category of material for proscription. It also follows that the State is not
barred by the First Amendment from prohibiting the distribution of unprotected
materials produced outside the State.
Id. at 765-66 (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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York's child-pornography statute impinged on high speech as well as
unprotected low speech.57 She applied strict scrutiny because pro-
tected speech was directly affected by the regulation, but found that
New York had a compelling interest in the regulation of child pornog-
raphy.58 Her concern regarding the possible suppression of ideas re-
flected the potential problems in applying content-based restrictions
to a class of speech, child pornography in this case, which is broader
than the unprotected category of obscenity. Justice O'Connor was not
addressing the issue of content-based restrictions on low speech as the
R.A.V. majority would have us believe.
Thus, when asserting "[o]ur cases surely do not establish the
proposition that the First Amendment imposes no obstacle whatso-
ever to regulation of particular instances of such proscribable expres-
sion, so that the government may regulate [them] freely," 59 the
majority was making more of a plea than a conclusion based on an
analysis of the precedent in the field. No case law has mandated that
restrictions on expression falling within the proscribable categories
cannot be content-based.
B. Cases on Content-Neutral Restrictions Also Fail to Justify the
Majority's New Doctrine
In addition to the lack of precedential support from cases involv-
ing content-based restrictions, the majority's position also lacks sup-
port from cases involving content-neutral restrictions. The majority
attempted to draw an analogy between the content-neutral require-
ment it established in R.A.V. and the traditional limitations on con-
tent-neutral restrictions for protected high speech.6" The majority
noted,
The proposition that a particular instance of speech can be pros-
cribable on the basis of one feature (e.g., obscenity) but not on
the basis of another (e.g., opposition to the city government) is
commonplace, and has found application in many contexts. We
have long held, for example, that nonverbal expressive activity
can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because
of the ideas it expresses-so that burning a flag in violation of
57. Id. at 774.
58. "[The] compelling interests identified in today's opinion suggest that the Constitu-
tion might in fact permit New York to ban knowing distribution of works depicting minors
engaged in explicit sexual conduct, regardless of the social value of the depictions." Id.
(citation omitted).
59. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538,2543 (1992) (quotations omitted) (alter-
ation in original).
60. Id. at 2544-45.
1126
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an ordinance against outdoor fires could be punishable, whereas
burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against dishonoring
the flag is not.61
This distinction with respect to flag-burning came from the decision in
United States v. O'Brien,62 where the Court found that incidental re-
strictions on protected speech may be constitutional if they are con-
tent-neutral.63 The O'Brien Court identified four factors that must be
met for a restriction to qualify as content-neutral.' The O'Brien test,
however, has only been used for cases involving high speech tradition-
ally considered worthy of constitutional protection.65 The O'Brien
Court did not extend this analysis to regulations on unprotected
speech.
In a 1989 case, Texas v. Johnson,66 the Court struck down a stat-
ute proscribing flag burning as an unjustified, content-based restric-
tion on expressive conduct.67 Although the majority did not find that
the proscribed activity fell within the class of fighting words,68 the dis-
sent would have so found.69 Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent
that:
As with fighting words, so with flag burning, for the purposes of
the First Amendment: It is no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed
by the public interest in avoiding a probable breech of the
peace.70
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Johnson dissent did not un-
dertake or even hint at the analysis that was later applied in R.A.V. in
determining whether restrictions on fighting words are valid.7'
61. Id. at 2544 (citing Barnes v. Glenn Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
62. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
63. Id. at 376-77.
64. Id. at 377 ("[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.").
65. Id. at 376.
66. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
67. Id. at 400 n.1.
68. Id. at 409.
69. Id. at 430-32 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 431 (alterations in original).
71. See id. at 421-35.
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C. Recent First Amendment Cases Are At Odds with the Majority's
Conclusion
In addition to the lack of support under traditional First Amend-
ment cases, there has been no indication in the most recent cases that
content-based restrictions violate free speech principles when applied
to expression that falls outside of traditional First Amendment protec-
tion. In Burson v. Freeman,72 the Court reviewed a Tennessee law
that prohibited campaigning or campaign materials within 100 feet of
a polling place on election day. The Court held that, while campaign-
ing was protected political speech under the First Amendment, the
free speech right could be limited in these circumstances When
weighed against the competing fundamental rights inherent in the vot-
ing process. The Court noted that the statute was underinclusive be-
cause it only restricted political speech. The Court "agree[d] that
distinguishing among types of speech requires that the statute be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny."73 The Court, however, found that the under-
inclusiveness of the statute was not fatal because there was no
evidence that the unregulated speech led to the same harms as polit-
ical speech. While the Court in Burson did acknowledge that underin-
clusiveness can give rise to strict scrutiny, it did so in the context of
speech protected under fundamental First Amendment principles, and
did not purport to extend strict scrutiny to fighting words.
The Supreme Court again examined a First Amendment chal-
lenge in Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Board.74 In this
case the Supreme Court struck down New York's "Son of Sam" law
which placed all proceeds from books written by criminals into an es-
crow account to be held for five years for payment of civil suits
brought by victims of that criminal. The Court held that this law acted
as a disincentive to create or publish works of a particular content.
Thus, "[i]n order to justify such differential treatment, 'the State must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state inter-
est and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'"5 The Court scruti-
nized the State's interest in assuring that criminals do not profit from
their crimes. In addition to finding the statue overbroadZ6 the Court
held that since the State only compensated victims out of the crimi-
nal's speech related assets while not placing similar burdens on other
72. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
73. Id. at 1855.
74. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
75. Id. at 509.
76. Id. at 511.
1128
assets the law was not narrowly tailored to meet its compelling inter-
est.77 While this analysis also presupposes an underinclusiveness doc-
trine, once again it only applied to fully protected speech.
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence in Simon &
Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Board,78 explicitly distinguished
laws directed at fully protected speech and speech of lesser value.
Kennedy stated that in this case "a law is directed to speech alone
where the speech in question is not obscene, not defamatory, not
words tantamount to an act otherwise criminal, not an impairment of
some other constitutional right, not an incitement to imminent lawless
action, and not calculated or likely to bring about niminent harm the
State has the substantive power to prevent. ' 79 He further noted "that
the foregoing types of expression are ... without First Amendment
protection, as evidenced by the proscription of some visual depictions
of sexual conduct by children .... 0
Of course, neither Burson nor Simon & Schuster addressed regu-
lation of fighting words or low speech and, therefore, the Court in
those cases did not speak directly to the questions raised in R.A.V.
However, the Court did not even hint at the new interpretation of
First Amendment precedent used in R.A.V., and instead impliedly re-
affirmed the approach that the R.A.v. majority later rejected.81
Instead of following established precedent, the majority in R.A. V.
simply ventured out into a new area of First Amendment protection
of its own creation. Furthermore, it did so without the aid of sufficient
briefing, on this new doctrine, by the parties involved.82
77. Id. at 510-11.
78. Id. at 501.
79. Id. at 512 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 514 (citation omitted).
81. Id.
82. See Brief for Petitioner, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 90-7675);
Brief for Respondent, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 90-7675); Reply Brief
for Petitioner, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 90-7675). One amicus brief
did address the issue of a content-discrimination limitation. See Brief of Center for Indi-
vidual Rights as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 10-17, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 90-7675). The amicus brief cited four Supreme Court cases and one
Seventh Circuit Court case in support of a content discrimination limitation. Id. Each of
the Supreme Court cases cited, however, involved content-based restrictions on non-pros-
cribable speech. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc., v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Papish v. Board of Curators, 410
U.S. 667 (1973); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). The Seventh Circuit case was
decided on other grounds but, in dicta, did indicate support for a content discrimination
limitation. Kucharek v. Hanaway, 902 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1990) (dictum), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 713 (1991). While the majority in R.A.V. disputed Justice White's assertion that the
issue of content-discrimination limitation was not "fairly included" within the questions
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EI. The Majority's "Common Sense" Analysis Defies
Common Sense
Lacking clear precedent for its new theory, the majority claimed
that "common sense" dictated the protection of fighting words against
viewpoint-based restrictions.83 The majority used the example of a
city council enacting "an ordinance prohibiting only those legally ob-
scene works that contain criticism of the city government or, indeed,
that do not include endorsement of the city government"' as demon-
strating the need for limitations on content-based restriction of pros-
cribable speech.
On first blush, this example may seem to support the majority's
theory. As Justice White noted in his concurring opinion, however,
"the Equal Protection Clause requires that the regulation of unpro-
tected speech be rationally related to a legitimate government inter-
est."8" The courts never give absolute deference to the legislature in
reviewing laws that draw distinctions such as the one in the majority's
example. Such a distinction between unprotected political obscenity
and unprotected apolitical obscenity would probably not pass rational
basis review due to the difficulty in justifying legislation which incor-
porates this distinction. The "fantastical"86 nature of such a law indi-
cates that it is unlikely to arise, let alone pass review.
If such a law was passed, however, and was rationally based, why
should it not become law? Inherent in the determination that speech
constitutes fighting words or obscenity is the determination that the
governmental interest in restricting the speech outweighs the slight
value the speech may have. If the government has a rational basis for
singling out a subset of that activity, then why should that subset be
any more deserving of protection than the whole? The Court has de-
termined that obscenity and fighting words are such ineffectual means
of communication that the First Amendment does not shield them
from regulation based on a legitimate government interest. Why then
should a subset of fighting words suddenly receive strict scrutiny be-
cause it is being rationally restricted due to content? If this subset of
speech effectively conveyed a political or other socially-redeeming
presented in the petition for certiorari, it did not dispute that the petitioner did not present
the "novel theory the majority adopt[ed]." R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542-43 n.3 (1992); Id. at
2550-51 n.1 (White, J., concurring).
83. R.A.Y, 112 S. Ct. at 2543.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2555 (White, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Summer 19941 RAV .CT FS.PU
message, then it would by definition not fall within the unprotected
class.
Similarly, Justice Scalia's comparison of low speech to the regula-
tion of sound trucks does not support the majority's new test.87 The
majority asserts that "[a]s with the sound truck, however, so also with
fighting words: The government may not regulate use based on hostil-
ity-or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed."88
This analogy assumes the sound truck is expressing a valid underlying
message. Unlike sound trucks, however, fighting words have so little
communicative value that the minimal underlying message does not
reach the level of First Amendment protection 9 and is outweighed by
the governmental interest in preventing harm.
IV. Exceptions to the New Doctrine
The majority did place some limits on its new doctrine, noting
that "[e]ven the prohibition against content discrimination that ... the
First Amendment requires is not absolute. It applies differently in the
context of proscribable speech than in the area of fully protected
speech."9 The majority carved out three exceptions to its main hold-
ing: restrictions on a subclass of speech the basis of which is the very
reason the general class of speech is proscribable, restrictions on a
subclass of speech associated with "secondary effects," and a catch-all,
"other bases" exception.
A. Restrictions on a Subclass of Speech the Basis of Which is the
Very Reason the General Class of Speech is Proscribable
The majority explained its first exception as follows:
When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely
of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscrib-
able, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination
exists. Such a reason, having been adjudged neutral enough to
support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First
Amendment protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis
of distinction within the class.9'
87. ld. at 2545. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (noting that a munici-
pality could control the abusive use of a loudspeaker provided the statute enacted was
narrowly drawn).
88. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
89. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
90. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
91. Id. at 2545-46.
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The rationale for this exception was that speech may vary to the ex-
tent that it reflects those characteristics, such as lasciviousness for ob-
scenity, that make a class of speech proscribable.92 Because these
characteristics are justifiably proscribed for their harmful nature, the
legislature should be free to regulate to a greater extent that speech
which most pronouncedly reflects such characteristics.
The majority used several examples to illustrate this point. First,
it noted that a "[s]tate might choose to prohibit only that obscenity
which is the most patently offensive in its prurience-i.e., that which
involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not
prohibit, for example, only that obscenity which includes offensive
political messages."9" The Court analogized that
the Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of
violence that are directed against the President,... since the
reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amend-
ment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied
to the person of the President.... But the Federal Government
may not criminalize only those threats against the President that
mention his policy on aid to inner cities.94
The majority supported this exception to its newly crafted rule
solely by example, without offering any, precedent for its justification.
Fortunately for the lower courts, with this exception the Court sal-
vaged much First Amendment doctrine that would otherwise be un-
constitutional under the new rule.95 In fact, the concurring opinions
suggest that this exception was an ad hoc creation, designed solely to
provide this result.96
92. Id. at 2546.
93. Id.
94. Id. (citations omitted).
95. Several decisions by the Supreme Court have upheld content-based restrictions on
proscribable speech. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (upholding a
statute that only criminalizes threats of violence directed against the President); see gener-
ally Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (upholding a statute that prohibited
campaigning or campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place on election day).
96. Justice White stated, "The Court has patched up its argument with an apparently
nonexhaustive list of ad hoc exceptions, in what can be viewed either as an attempt to
confine the effects of its decision to the facts of this case .... or as an effort to anticipate
some of the questions that will arise from its radical revision of First Amendment law."
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2556 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that "[p]erhaps
because the Court recognizes these perversities, it quickly offers some ad hoc limitations
on its newly extended prohibition on content-based regulations." Id. at 2565 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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Regardless of the purpose behind the creation of this exception,
the real question is whether it provides a principled basis for distin-
guishing between constitutional and unconstitutional content-based
restrictions on low speech. Justice Stevens took aim at the second of
the majority's examples in his concurrence.97 He argued that even
assuming that "Congress may choose from the set of unprotected
speech (all threats) to proscribe only a subset (threats against the
President) because those threats are particularly likely to cause 'fear
of violence,' 'disruption,' and actual 'violence,"' 98 this reasoning
would still allow St. Paul to enact the R.A.V. ordinance without violat-
ing the Constitution. Justice Stevens argued that St. Paul's City Coun-
cil should be given the same deference when it determined that the
subclass of unprotected speech it proscribed generates the kinds of
problems that are the very reason the general class of speech is pro-
scribed.99 He noted that "[j]ust as Congress may determine that
threats against the President entail more severe consequences than
other threats, so St. Paul's City Council may determine that threats
based on the target's race, religion, or gender cause more severe harm
to both the target and to society than other threats."" Justice Ste-
vens concluded that the judgment "that harms caused by racial, reli-
gious, and gender-based invective are qualitatively different from that
[sic] caused by other fighting words-seem[ed] to [him] eminently
reasonable and realistic."' 1 Indeed, it is not clear why threats based
on a target's race cannot be found to embody, to a significantly
greater extent than plain threats, the very reason that threats are pros-
cribable under the First Amendment.
The majority identified the rationale for proscribing threats as
"protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption
that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened vio-
lence will occur."'0" The majority, however, did not thoroughly ana-
lyze these factors. The majority is correct that fear for the President's
life would create a substantial public disruption. The possibility that
the threatened violence against the President will occur, however, is
most likely very small. Because Presidents are generally deemed to
be responsible for the country's policies, it would not be surprising if
they received death threats over the course of their tenure in office.
97. Id. at 2565 (Stevens, J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2546.
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Due to lack of conviction and extraordinarily tight security, however,
such threats are rarely acted upon. The low probability of the success-
ful completion of the threatened action necessarily reduces the level
of public fear of violence. Members of the general public are proba-
bly more afraid of threats of violence against themselves because of
the high crime rates in our society. Arguably, race-based threats cre-
ate an even greater fear because of the history surrounding such
threats. 0 3
In its example, the majority differentiated between criminalizing
threats against the President and threats against the President men-
tioning administration policy on aid to the inner cities. 10 4 There may
be circumstances, however, where it is legitimate for Congress to de-
termine that threats pertaining to urban policy have "special force"1°5
with respect to the reason threats against the President are proscrib-
able. For example, our society faces growing unrest in the inner cities,
as the riots in response to the Rodney King verdict in 1992 illus-
trate.' 6 Due to the current dissatisfaction in the inner cities and the
potential for social unrest resulting from perceptions of aid policies
for urban areas, threats against the President based on such policies
may in fact create an even greater fear of violence, a greater disrup-
tion engendered by that fear, and a greater possibility that the
threatened violence will occur than for ordinary threats against the
President. 0 7 Under these circumstances, it might appear that threats
based on the President's aid policy to the inner cities "consist[ ] en-
tirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscrib-
able."'0° Yet the majority dismissed such a regulation out of hand
without considering the possibility that Congress could have a justifi-
cation that is entirely consistent with the majority's rationale for the
exception. 0 9
The majority treated the application of this exception to the St.
Paul ordinance in the same cursory fashion, stating that the ordinance
"assuredly does not fall within the exception for content discrimina-
tion based on the very reasons why the particular class of speech at
103. See Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2365-66 (1989).
104. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
105. Id.
106. See L.A. Readies Kids For New King Verdict, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 21, 1993, at B5.
107. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
108. Id. at 2545.
109. Id.
issue (here, fighting words) is proscribable." l ° The majority's conclu-
sion ignored the possibility that the St. Paul City Council may have
determined that the class of fighting words proscribed by this ordi-
nance 1' is inherently more threatening than other classes of fighting
words." 2
Interestingly, in the 1992-1993 Term following the R.A.V. deci-
sion, the Court unanimously acknowledged the special impact of bias-
motivated acts. Wisconsin v. Mitchell,"3 a decision written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, upheld a Wisconsin statute that enhanced penalties
where the underlying crimes were bias-motivated. The Court ruled
that,
the Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired
conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater indi-
vidual and societal harm. For example, according to the State
... bias motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory
crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite
community unrest .... The State's desire to redress these per-
ceived harms provides an adequate explanation for its penalty-
enhancement provision over and above mere disagreement with
offenders' beliefs or biases. As Blackstone said long ago, "it is
but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those
should be most severely punished, which are the most destruc-
tive of the public safety and happiness.""' 4
The justifications for the Wisconsin ordinance, which the Court ac-
cepted in Mitchell, apply with equal force to the proposition in R.A. V.;
that bias-motivated fighting words are substantially more harmful
than ordinary fighting words and therefore warrant special treatment.
The majority in R.A.V., however, ignored the logic they would
later embrace for sentence enhancements and dismissed these argu-
ments. Justice Scalia noted that St. Paul "proscribed fighting words of
whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or
religious intolerance. Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that
the city seeks to handicap the expression of particular ideas. That
possibility would alone be enough to render the ordinance presump-
110. Id. at 2548.
111. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
112. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of St. Paul's or-
dinance, noted that "[t]here are certain symbols and regalia that in the context of history
carry a clear message of racial supremacy, hatred, persecution, and degradation of certain
groups." In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507,508 (Minn. 1991) (quoting Mar J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech- Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2365-66
(1989)).
113. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
114. Id. at 2201 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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tively invalid. .. " ",5 The majority rested this conclusion on its belief
that St. Paul banned an idea as opposed to a "mode" of expression." 6
The majority did not adequately explain why the use of race-based,
religion-based, or gender-based fighting words could not be consid-
ered a mode of inflicting a specific type of harm with "special force""n7
in the context of fighting words.
Justice Scalia did respond by arguing that "[w]hat makes the an-
ger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc. produced by violation of this ordi-
nance distinct from the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc., produced
by other fighting words is nothing other than the fact that it is caused
by a distinctive idea, conveyed by a distinctive message.""" The same
is true, however, for threats directed at the President; they are merely
distinctive ideas conveyed by distinctive messages. What sets these
threats apart is that Congress determined that as a class they have
special force. Similarly, what sets race-based, gender-based, or reli-
gious-based fighting words apart is that they too have special force.
As Justice White noted,
A prohibition on fighting words is not a time, place, or manner
restriction; it is a ban on a class of speech that conveys an over-
riding message of personal injury and imminent violence .... a
message that is at its ugliest when directed against groups that
have long been the targets of discrimination. Accordingly, the
ordinance falls within the first exception to the majority's
theory." 9
B. The Secondary Effects and Catch-All Exceptions
The majority created two other exceptions to its newly articulated
doctrine: an extended secondary effects doctrine, and a catch-all Px-
ception. Through the secondary effects exception, the majority simply
extended the secondary effects doctrine, enunciated in Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc. 2' and Barnes v. Glen Theatre,'2' so that it applied
to proscribable speech as well as protected speech.'" The majority's
expansion of this doctrine is a natural corollary to its expansion of the
doctrine prohibiting content-based regulation to the area of proscrib-
able speech.
115. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549 (1992).
116. Id. at 2548-49.
117. Id. at 2548.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2557 (White, J., concurring).
120. 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986).
121. 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2469 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
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The catch-all exception is more unusual and potentially problem-
atic. In creating this exception, Justice Scalia noted:
There may be other such bases [for exceptions] as well. Indeed,
to validate such selectivity (where totally proscribable speech is
at issue) it may not even be necessary to identify any particular
"neutral" basis, so long as the nature of the content discrimina-
tion is such that there is no realistic possibility that official sup-
pression of ideas is afoot.123
The majority conceded that it could not, for example, "think of any
First Amendment interest that would stand in the way of a State's
prohibiting only those obscene motion pictures with blue-eyed ac-
tresses.'1 24 This, however, put the majority in the awkward position
of implying that entirely arbitrary restrictions on proscribable speech
are allowable under the First Amendment, while restrictions aimed at
preventing specific and substantial harms are constitutionally suspect.
By creating this distinction, the majority impliedly acknowledged that
fighting words are unprotected by the First Amendment because they
can be arbitrarily limited. The only time these words acquire First
Amendment protection is when the state limits them for content-
based reasons. Thus, the subclass of racial, religious, or gender-based
fighting words gain special protected status's due to the state's mo-
tives in proscribing them. This is a backward approach to First
Amendment protection of speech. There must be protectible content
in the speech itself to merit consideration under the First Amend-
ment, irrespective of how the state treats such speech. If a particular
class of speech can be arbitrarily restricted without violating the First
Amendment, how can the very same speech suddenly gain protection
against non-arbitrary restrictions?
The First Amendment protection must exist prior to state action
to be implicated after state action. The lack of any rational basis re-
quirement indicates that the protection does not exist prior to restric-
tion, and thus the speech should be entirely proscribable, regardless of
the state's rationale, be it content-based or not. What is even more
surprising about this dual standard for proscribable speech, is that
when the state's restrictions are content-based, the majority would ap-
ply strict scrutiny, providing fighting words with a level of protection
equivalent to the most protected political speech. 26
123. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
124. Id.
125. By "protected status" I am referring to the protection from content-based restric-
tions such fighting words are given under the majority's opinion.
126. Justice White argued,
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In his concurrence, Justice Stevens noted that many of the
Court's past cases "involved the selective regulation of speech based
on content-precisely the sort of regulation the Court invalidates to-
day. Such selective regulations are unavoidably content-based, but
they are not, in my opinion, 'presumptively invalid."' 12 7 He further
pointed out that:
The Court states that the prohibition on content-based regula-
tions "applies differently in the context of proscribable speech
than in the context of other speech," . . . but its analysis belies
that claim. The Court strikes down the St. Paul ordinance be-
cause it regulates fighting words based on subject matter, de-
spite the fact that . ..we have long upheld regulations of
commercial speech based on subject matter. The Court's self-
description is inapt: By prohibiting the regulation of fighting
words based on its [sic] subject matter, the Court provides the
same protection to fighting words as is currently provided to
core political speech.'
The majority may have created the three exceptions to its new
approach to content-based restrictions on proscribable speech in or-
der to salvage prior decisions in this area of First Amendment law.
These exceptions did not, however, cure the infirmities in this new
doctrine, and created as many problems as they resolved in determin-
ing when speech restrictions are valid. 29
. V. Effects of the New Doctrine
In light of this new doctrine for content-based restrictions on
proscribable speech, we are left with the question: What will be its
impact on First Amendment jurisprudence? The doctrine will have its
most immediate effect in three areas: hate-speech ordinances, com-
mercial speech, and Title VII challenges.
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment in Burson [v. Freeman], reasoning that
the statute, "though content-based, is constitutional [as] a reasonable, viewpoint-
neutral regulation of a nonpublic forum."... However, nothing in his reasoning
in the present case suggests that a content-based ban on fighting words would be
constitutional were that ban limited to nonpublic fora. Taken together, the two
opinions suggest that, in some settings, political speech, to which "the First
Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application,"' is entitled to less con-
stitutional protection than fighting words.
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2555 n.8 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 2564 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cul-
tural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REv. 103
(1992).
128. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2564 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. See Schimmel, supra note 1.
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A. Implications for Hate-Speech Ordinances
The new content-neutrality requirement will effectively eliminate
the ability of a state to create a narrowly tailored ordinance aimed
specifically at the harms of racial, religious, or gender-based fighting
words that would otherwise pass constitutional muster. The majority
has made it clear that they view the harms of such fighting words to be
simply the direct result of the message conveyed and of the same class
of insult as "aspersions upon a person's mother."' 130 The majority has
left available only one option for proscribing such fighting words, and
that is a statute that prohibits all fighting words regardless of content,
such as a general assault statute. Unfortunately, this approach allows
no recognition by the state of the special harm inherent in a particular
subclass of fighting words, no matter how painful, odious or
destructive.
Furthermore, these limitations will also most likely curtail cam-
pus speech codes designed to eliminate an atmosphere of racial hostil-
ity in the educational setting. Because public colleges are usually held
to be state actors with respect to speech restrictions, campus hate-
speech codes similar to the St. Paul ordinance would also be
unconstitutional. 13 1
In addition, there is likely to be confusion in lower courts trying
to interpret the three exceptions to the majority's doctrine. The ma-
jority gave no insight as to how to define what is "the very reason [an]
entire class of speech at issue is proscribable."'1 32 The divisions in the
R.A.V. decision as to how to apply this exception foreshadow confu-
sion in interpretation by the lower courts. Furthermore, the major-
ity's third, catch-all exception provides no guidance in distinguishing
between official suppression and arbitrary restrictions. The majority
suggested only that "so long as the nature of the content discrimina-
tion is such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression
of ideas is afoot,"' 33 a content-based restriction is constitutional.
The Court has left one additional avenue open for punishing hate
speech. Wisconsin v. Mitchell' 34 held that sentence enhancements de-
termined by whether the defendant selected a victim based on the vic-
tim's race or gender did not violate the defendant's First Amendment
130. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
131. See generally Schimmel, supra note 1.
132. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
133. Id. at 2547.
134. 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2202 (1993).
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rights.135 Of course, such penalty enhancements require that the de-
fendant first commit an assault or other crime in order for the state to
address the underlying motivations. These enhancements cannot be
used to attack hate speech alone, even when such speech may consti-
tute fighting words. 36
B. Implications for Commercial Speech
It is unlikely that the new principles established in R.A.V. will
have any impact on commercial speech regulation. Instead, the doc-
trinal approaches to these areas of proscribable speech will most likely
continue to diverge, undermining any possibility for articulating a uni-
fied approach to proscribable speech.
Both commercial speech and fighting words are considered to be
proscribable speech, not meriting the highest level of protection under
the First Amendment. As such, the courts should treat these areas
analogously. However, it is unlikely that the R.A.V. approach will be
incorporated into commercial speech principles. In recent commercial
speech cases, the Court gave great deference to legislatures imposing
content-based regulations on commercial speech.'37 In R.A.V., how-
ever, the majority did not give deference to the City Council in fash-
ioning content-based restrictions on fighting words. Justice Stevens
noted in his concurrence to R.A.V. that:
the Court recognizes that a State may regulate advertising in
one industry but not another because the "risk of fraud (one of
the characteristics that justifies depriving [commercial speech]
135. The Wisconsin penalty enhancement provision increases the maximum penalty for
a crime whenever a defendant "[i]ntentionally selects the person against whom the crime
... is committed or selects the property which is damaged or otherwise affected by the
crime ... because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin
or ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property.. . ." Id. at 2197 n.1.
136. Although the constitutionality of such sentence enhancements was upheld by the
Court, there are obvious parallels between this issue and the hate speech ordinance struck
down in R.A.V. A critical analysis of the Court's reasoning in Mitchell and the distinctions
it draws from R.A.V., however, are beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Stephen
R. Martin II, Note, Establishing the Constitutional Use of Bias-Inspired Beliefs and Expres-
sions in Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 27 CREIGHroN L.
Rnv. 503 (1994); Brian Resler, Note, Hate Crimes-New Limits on the Scope of First
Amendment Protection?, 77 MARQ. L. Rv. 415 (1994).
137. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (requiring only a reasonable
fit between regulation and state interest); Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R.,
478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding a ban on local advertising when the advertised activity
could be banned by the state; and giving greater deference to the legislature in determining
the best approach); see also Albert P. Mauro, Comment, Commercial Speech After Posadas
and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. Rnv. 1931
(1992).
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of full First Amendment protection... )" in the regulated indus-
try is "greater" than in other industries .... Again, the same
reasoning demonstrates the constitutionality of St. Paul's ordi-
nance. "[O]ne of the characteristics that justifies" the constitu-
tional status of fighting words is that such words "by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace."... Certainly, a legislature that may determine that
the risk of fraud is greater in the legal trade than in the medical
trade may determine that the risk of injury or breach of the
peace created by race-based threats is greater than that created
by other threats.1 38
The majority in R.A.V., however, did not follow a course parallel to
commercial speech doctrine. It is also unlikely that the Court will di-
verge from the recent developments in commercial speech regula-
tions. 39 Thus, it appears that we will continue to see diverging
approaches to analogous areas of First Amendment law with the
Court continuing to rely on ad hoe exceptions, such as those in R.A.V.,
to justify its conclusions.
C. Impact on Title VII Actions
The third area likely to be directly affected by the ruling in
R.A.V. is Title VII 140 actions for sexual and racial harassment in the
workplace. The new fighting words doctrine potentially renders cur-
rent Title VII doctrine unconstitutional.
1. Title VII Doctrine
Courts have generally found two forms of workplace harassment
to violate Title VII: "quid pro quo" and "creation of a hostile work
environment." '' In quid pro quo harassment, an employee is con-
fronted with submitting to sexual advances in order to receive benefits
or promotion, or simply to avoid being fired.'42 For the second form
of harassment, an employee is forced to endure a hostile work envi-
ronment because "the workplace is so 'polluted' with sexual hostility
toward women-or racial hostility to other races-that it discrimina-
138. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2565 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
139. See Mauro, supra note 137; Bruce P. Keller, Recent Developments in the Law of
Advertising and Commercial Speech, C790 A.L.I. 47 (1992).
140. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991). See also 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1991);
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991).
141. See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 484-85 (1991).
142. Id. at 485.
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torily alters the 'terms and conditions of employment' within the
meaning of the statute."'143
A federal court first recognized the hostile work environment vi-
olation of Title VII in Rogers v. EEOC,1' where the Fifth Circuit held
that an
[e]mployee's psychological as well as economic fringes are statu-
torily entitled to protection from employer abuse, and ... the
phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in Sec-
tion 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protec-
tive ambit the practice of creating a working environment
heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination. 45
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) adopted a
set of guidelines'46 for enforcing Title VII based on the expansive ap-
proach of Rogers, which the Supreme Court later endorsed in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson. 4 7 The Court noted that "[i]n concluding that
so-called 'hostile environment' (i.e., non quid pro quo) harassment vi-
olates Title VII, the EEOC drew upon a substantial body of judicial
decisions and EEOC precedent holding that Title VII affords employ-
ees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory in-
timidation, ridicule, and insult."'48 In its guidelines, the EEOC defines
sexual harassment as "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
[that] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment."' 49 Although the guidelines are ostensi-
bly targeted at verbal conduct, "courts have consistently interpreted
[this] to mean 'verbal expression." '150 Indeed, Title VII violations
usually stem directly from a person's expressed beliefs of racial or
gender superiority, and the actions brought are aimed at suppressing
143. Id. This Comment only focuses on the implications of R.A.V. for the latter form of
harassment.
144. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 857 (1972).
145. Id. at 238.
146. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991).
147. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Interestingly, this opinion, supporting expansive protection
from discriminatory ridicule and insult in the workplace, was written by then-Justice Rehn-
quist. Id.
148. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
149. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1991) (emphasis added).
150. Browne, supra note 141, at 482 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp.
419, 432 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (noting that the term "'verbal conduct of a sexual nature' ...
seems to be directed toward profane words and pictures that deal with sex"), afJ'd, 805
F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (footnotes omitted)). See also
Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 1791, 1798-1800 (1992).
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those viewpoints.15' In Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 52 the Sixth
Circuit articulated that Title VII requires employers to prevent em-
ployees from expressing offensive viewpoints, holding that
while Title VII does not require an employer to fire all "Archie
Bunkers" in its employ, the law does require that an employer
take prompt action to prevent such bigots from expressing their
opinions in a way that abuses or offends their coworkers. By
informing people that the expression of racist or sexist attitudes
in public is unacceptable, people may eventually learn that such
views are undesirable in private, as well. Thus, Title VII may
advance the goal of eliminating prejudices and biases in our
society. 5 3
This description of hostile-environment regulation demonstrates that
Title VII regulates expression on the basis of viewpoint.'54
2. Title VII After R.A.V.
Under the general rule established by the R.A.V majority-that
viewpoint-discriminatory statutes are unconstitutional even as applied
to proscribable speech-Title VII would be rendered unconstitutional
because it prohibits the expression of offensive viewpoints in the
workplace. The majority in R.A.V., however, went to great lengths to
distinguish Title VII from invalid content-based speech restrictions
such as the St. Paul ordinance. The majority noted that:
since words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not
against speech but against conduct . . . , a particular content-
based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept
up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct
rather than speech. Thus, for example, sexually derogatory
fighting words, among other words, may produce a violation of
Title VII's general prohibition against sexual discrimination in
employment practices. Where the government does not target
conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not
shielded from regulation merely because they express a discrim-
inatory idea or philosophy.' 55
151. Browne, supra note 141, at 483.
152. 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989).
153. Id. at 350.
154. See Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on
Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NoTRn DAME L. REv. 1003, 1004 (1993) ("That
[the federal hostile-environment laws] discriminate on the basis of viewpoint... is not in
doubt. The government's interest in the hostile-environment cases is entirely one of sup-
pressing offensive or disagreeable ideas--'the right to work in an environment free from
... ridicule, and insult."').
155. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546-47 (1992) (quotations omitted)
(citations omitted); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2200 (1993) (noting that
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Thus, the majority di*smissed any application of its holding in R.A.V.
to Title VII cases, arguing that Title VII is directed at conduct and not
speech. The majority also argued that restrictions on proscribable
speech under Title VII are congtitutional under the secondary effects
exception to its content discrimination doctrine. 56 This conception of
Title VII doctrine, however, is incorrect.
In many Title VII cases, the offensive nature of an employee's
expressed viewpoint, as well as its impact on the victim, are important
elements in establishing a hostile work environment. For example, in
EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc.,57 the court held that ra-
cial slurs repeatedly written on chalkboards and the construction of a
wooden cross near where the plaintiff worked contributed to the crea-
tion of a hostile work environment. 58 The slurs at issue in Murphy
Motor Freight Lines, such as, "The only good nigger is a dead nigger,"
and, "Send all blacks back to Africa,' 59 were crude expressions of
racial superiority, similar to the burning cross used by Robert Viktora,
yet they were found to have helped create illegal racial harassment in
the workplace. Alternately, in Goluszek v. Smith, the court rejected
the claim by a male plaintiff that his coworkers sexually harassed him
with their lewd comments concerning the plaintiffs sex life.160 The
Goluszek court held that harassment occurs where "the offender is
saying by words or actions that the victim is inferior because of the
victim's sex," which is not the case when the harassed as well as the
harassers are male. 6' This holding illustrates that the effect of the
expression on the class of victims is an important factor in finding a
violation of Title VII, as was also the case for the St. Paul
ordinance.' 62
in R.A.V. the Court found Title VII to be permissible content-neutral regulation of
conduct).
156. See supra notes 22-61 and accompanying text.
157. 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn. 1980).
158. Id. at 384-86. See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding for the first time that coworkers' displays of sexually-oriented
pictures and use of sexual remarks that did not constitute propositions could create a hos-
tile work environment even without any other abusive conduct).
159. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. at 384.
160. 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1454-56 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
161. Id. at 1456.
162. See also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Conduct that many
men consider unobjectionable may offend many women."); Andrews v. City of Philadel-
phia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that although men might find obscenity
and pornography in the workplace harmless, women might find it highly offensive, thereby
creating a hostile work environment); Williams v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 627 F. Supp.
752, 755-56 n.2 (W.D. Mo. 1986) ("[lIt seems impermissible to exempt [railroad workers]
from rules forbidding racial insults. Railroad workers doubtless know how to speak and
Thus, despite what the R.A.V. majority claims, in Title VII ac-
tions the government is arguably targeting conduct in part on the basis
of its expressive content,'6 3 and not because of the "secondary effects"
of the speech. As Professor Browne noted,
Unlike the ordinance in Renton, which sought to regulate adult
movie theaters without reference to any "viewpoint" that might
be expressed in the films, sexual harassment regulations prohibit
speech primarily on the basis of the viewpoint expressed. An
employee's work performance may be seriously affected by his
coworkers' telling him he is the illegitimate offspring of a dis-
eased prostitute, but he is entitled to no protection. An em-
ployee may be similarly offended by continual expression of
feminist viewpoints in the workplace. Such employees, how-
ever, are without recourse under Title VII.' 4
Title VII, therefore, should not fall within the majority's secondary
effects exception to its new doctrine.
Justice White, in his concurring opinion, suggested that one rea-
son for the expansive secondary effects exception in R.A.V. was to
salvage the constitutionality of Title VII. He noted 'that "there is a
simple explanation for the Court's eagerness to craft an exception to
its new First Amendment rule: Under the general rule the Court ap-
plies in this case, Title VII hostile work environment claims would
suddenly be unconstitutional."' 16 Justice White pointed out that Title
VII regulation is similar to the St. Paul ordinance "because it 'im-
pose[s] special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects."' 66 Justice White then rebutted the majority's as-
sertion that because Title VII is aimed at proscribable conduct, the
secondary effects exception insulates it from constitutional challenge.
He correctly noted that
the hostile work environment regulation is not keyed to the
presence of an economic quid pro quo, but to the impact of the
speech on the victimized worker. Consequently, the regulation
would no more fall within a secondary effects exception than
does the St. Paul ordinance. Second, the majority's focus on the
statute's general prohibition on discrimination glosses over the
language of the specific regulation governing hostile working
behave in 'mixed company.' They must realize that under Title VII railroad workers are a
'mixed company.'").
163. Browne, supra note 141, at 483 ("[P]rotected expression is often a substantial, if
not the primary, basis for imposing liability.") (footnote omitted).
164. Md at 522 (citations omitted).
165. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2557 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
166. Id. (quoting Justice Scalia's majority opinion at page 2547).
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environment, which reaches beyond any "incidental" effect on
speech.' 67
The majority's validation of government regulation targeted at
conduct but not based on the expressive content of that conduct ig-
nored the fact that elements of Title VII are aimed at the expressive
content of conduct and even speech. Verbal harassment in the work-
place that creates a work environment that is hostile to certain groups
violates Title VII regulations precisely because of its communicative
impact on the listener.168 Because Title VII has been interpreted to
be directed specifically at racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimina-
tion, it should be subject to the same infirmities that made the St. Paul
ordinance unconstitutional. Clearly, the majority was stretching its
characterization of Title VII to avoid finding it unconstitutional under
the new doctrine. Although the majority did assert that Title VII was
still constitutional in dicta, it is not clear that this assertion can survive
a direct challenge under the new viewpoint-discrimination doctrine.
After R.A.V., if a defendant challenges the broad definition of a hos-
tile work environment laid out under Title VII,169 the courts will be
faced with either invalidating Title VII or relying on the arbitrary and
incorrect inclusion of Title VII in the secondary effects exception to
the R.A.V. doctrine. Unfortunately, the future of Title VII protection
against workplace harassment after the R.A.V. decision has been
thrown into considerable doubt.
Conclusion
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul is a radical departure from traditional
First Amendment precedent in its new content-discrimination prohibi-
tion for fighting words. Justice Scalia's opinion provides little gui-
dance in the application of the new general rule or the exceptions to
the rule, and the rationales it offers are logically troublesome and in-
consistent. As a result, the holding throws the current case law on
Title VII into doubt.
In June of 1992, when Robert A. Viktora burned a cross on the
front yard of an African American's home, he intended to convey a
message of hate. Little did he realize that his act would precipitate a
radical alteration in the landscape of First Amendment protection of
167. Id. (citations omitted).
168. See Volokh, supra note 150 (noting that just because Title VII does not explicitly
mention speech it is not immunized from First Amendment scrutiny).
169. Defined as an environment that is not "free from discriminatory intimidation, ridi-
cule, and insult." Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1991) (endorsing
the EEOC guidelines on hostile work environment).
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proscribable speech. Unfortunately, we will not know the full effects
of his act until this new doctrine has been played out in the First
Amendment decisions to come.

